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THE ROLE OF A CENTRAL BANK IN AN ECONOMY
0. Ola Vincent
Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria

There are, however, two notable exceptions to this pattern of
origin of central banks in the developed countries. These are
the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve System of the
United States. Each of them was set up as a central bank from
the start and vested with all the functions and powers of a
central bank. The Federal Reserve System of the United States
(a system of 12 Federal Reserve Districts each with its own
Federal Reserve Bank whose activities are co-ordinated
through the Federal Reserve Board in Washington) was set up
by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 as a Federal Central
Banking system for the United States . The Bank of Canada
was established in 1934 and nationalised in 1938.
In many of the less developed countries, (LDCs) central
banks were set up by Governments to perform functions similar to those of the more developed countries (MDCs) as well as
engage actively in the promotion of accelerated economic
development. Thus, the most common form of central banks in
the LDCs is a government-owned institution.
It is evident from the above exposition that modern central
banking is a relatively recent economic phenomenon that
rarely predates this century. Prior to the establishment of
central banks in the developed economies, the concept of the
"invisible hand ," (enunciated by Adam Smith), a natural law
which operates automatically with built-in penalties and rewards and which inevitably pushes and restores the economy
to equilibrium was accepted as a sufficient regulatory force in
the sphere of economic activities.
Confidence in the invisible hand was undermined in England during the period of many banking and monetary crises
especially those of 1825-1837, 1847, 1857 and 1866 which were
contained because the Bank of England used its paternal influence and relationship with other British banks to restore order.
This firmly established the Bank of England as Great Britain 's
central bank. Eventually many countries emulated the example
of Britain and established central banks in their countries and
today the Bank of England enjoys the unique honour of being
called the mother of central banks, although the Riksbank of
Sweden is chronologically the oldest Central Bank in the
world.
These and other central banks both in the MDCs and LDCs
were established as alternative to the self-regulatory system of
the " invisible hand" which proved inefficient in preventing
frequent financial crises. Thus, they were set up and empowered to exercise discretionary control over the financial system
in particular and the economy in general. The LDCs were not
spared of the menace of fi nancial crisis prior to establishing
their own central banks. Nigeria is a case in point. For example, it was after the collapse of the banking boom of the late
forties and early fifties in Nigeria that the Banking Ordinance
of 1952 was passed. Then followed moves between 1952 and
1958 to establish the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) with
power to exercise discretionary control over the financial sys-

The lecture seeks to spell out the origin, nature and importance of Central Banking in the market-oriented
economies. The lecture is divided into six parts. Part I discusses the concept of central ban.king including its origin and
ratio nale. Part II is devoted to a brief discussion of the Functions of a central bank. In Part ill, monetary policy formu lation and implementation, the most important function of a
central bank is discussed in some detail. Part IV discusses the
relationship between Government and the Central Bank while
Part V focusses on the Nigerian situation, especially the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria (C.B .N.) and the
Government (Treasury). Part VI summarises the paper.

Part I
CONCEPT AND ORIGIN OF CENTRAL BANKING
I Like to begin the lecture by asking the grass-root question,
"What is a Central Bank?". Briefly and functionally defined, a
Central Bank is the national institution that traditionally possesses the monopoly of the issuance of legal tender money in a
country; it is entrusted with the custody of the cash reserves of
the banking system (i.e. functions as a banker to banks); and
acts as lender of last resort. It usually acts as banker and
financial adviser to government, and in most cases, it is the
custodian and manager of the nation's foreign exchange reserves. A major and perhaps the most important function of a
central bank is the formulation and execution of monetary
policy which involves the discretionary control of money
supply in pursuit of specified national economic goals. Thus ,
in character, it is central; it is a macro institution whose
activities affect the whole national economic life.

Origins of Central Banking
Most central banks in today's developed economies did not
start off in the same way as the newer ones in the developing
economies did. In many cases, they were privately-owned,
joint-stock commercial banks that gradually acquired the sole
right of the issuance of legal tender money in the countries in
which they operated. Thereafter they took on other functions
of central banking and eventually statutorily became known as
the Central Bank of the country with or without complete
government ownership.
For example, the Bank of England was founded by a group
of City of London merchants as a joint-stock bank with limited
liability in 1694. Although between 1694 and 1877 it gradually
assumed all the functions of a central bank outlined above, it
was nationalised only in 1946 from when it could be described
as a prototype central bank. Banque de France (the Bank of
France or Central Bank of France) was established in 1800 by
Napoleon. Since 1848 it has been the sole bank of issue in
France and from then on assumed all the other central banking
functions although it was nationalised only in 1945.
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--tern and consequently influence overall economic activity in
the country.
There is, however, a major difference between the financial
systems of the MDCs and those of the LDCs at the points in
time in which they established their Central Banks. In the
MDCs developed financial systems were already carrying out
sophisticated banking operations. But they tended to misbehave rather frequently and thus plunged these economies
into several financial crises. Besides, their performances revealed some gaps and loopholes in the financial arrangements
within these economies, the plugging of which called for
positive action by their respective governments. Thus, in these
countries, central banking was justified by the need for an
institution that could control the existing financial systems and
promote the goals of national economic development.
In the LDCs, the situation was different. Many of these
countries had no financial system worthy of mention. Where a
skeletal financial system existed, it was predominantly, if not
wholly foreign-owned and controlled. In teans of financial
arrangements, whatever existed was between the foreign
banks and their head offices overseas and had little or no
consideration for the local economies in which they operated.
Thus , the need for these economies centred around establishing the necessary indigenous financial institutions and arrangements which could be effectively manipulated to achieve
the goals of their respective national economies.
Nationalism was another important factor that accounted for
the establishment of central banks in different countries.
Nationalism dictated that the national image of each country
should be adequately projected in international financial relationships. This could best be done through owning a central
bank that would represent the country in international financial
forum, hence the call during an international monetary conference in 1922 that every country that had no central bank should
establish one. Following this, as many as thirty-nine central
banks were established between 1921 and 1935 mainly in the
MDCs. Later, the LDCs followed suit. Many of the Central
Banks in the latter economies were set up to replace existing
currency boards, such as the West African Currency Board that
served former British West African Countries as an automatic
currency exchange institution that had no monetary management functions, no control of banking operations and were
foreign in character and orientation.

Issue of Legal Tender Currency

Because of the primary importance of legal tender currency
(notes and coins) in the smooth functioning of an economy and
in the development of the economy, the issue of legal tender
money was the foremost responsibility of all central banks the
world over. The names, denominations and forms of such
currencies came to be ultimately determined by the government and central bank after the central bank acquired sole right
of issue of the currency. The currency of a country is regarded
as its national emblem in the economic field. As such its
internal and international values have to be jealously safeguarded. To this end, central banks endeavour to prevent
over-issue of their country's currencies in order to avoid its
depreciation. They also seek to provide it with adequate volumes of foreign exchange backing so as to maintain international respect for it even where it is not a traded currency as is
the case with currencies of virtually all developing countries.
Legal tender currency is generally termed base money or
high powered money because it forms the basis of commercial
banks ' money and a credit creation. The issue of legal tender
currency originates from the monetization of credit instruments (principally of the government) by the Central Bank as
well as from the monetization of foreign exchange surrendered
to the central bank by all sectors of the economy.
To service the economy with legal tender currency, the
central bank organises not only its production but also its
distribution and the periodic replacement of unserviceable
ones. It recommends legislations to prevent the production and
circulation of counterfeit currency in the economy by unscrupulous elements and thus ensure that the currency is not
debased.
Management of External Reserves

In managing the nation's external reserves, 1 the central bank
seeks to maintain an adequate volume of external reserves to
preserve the value and international respect of its domestic
currency.
Thus a major focus of policy in this context is the conservation of reserves. Regulations as to how the release of foreign
exchange to economic agents that need them for foreign payments is formulated to guide the central bank in allocating
foreign exchange. Rationing of reserves is necessitated by the
fact that there is hardly any country which could boast of
having adequate foreign reserves that could be freely used by
all in the economy for all types of foreign transactions without
restrictions. Even the U.S. and U.K. whose national currencies are used as international currencies have to limit the
amount of it that could be made available at different points in
time. The regulations relating to foreign exchange management involves placing restrictions on remittances both for
current and capital transactions.
Another approach to foreign exchange management involves hedging against fluctuations or depreciation in the
value of foreign reserves of a country as could be caused by
extraneous factors such as devaluation or depreciation of international currencies in which the reserves are held.

Part D
FUNCTIONS OF A CENTRAL BANK

Central Banking functions include the so-called traditional
ones and the developmental ones emphasised by the less developed countries. The major traditional functions are, the
issuance of legal tender currency, exercising surveillance over
the operations of the banking system with a view to ensuring
sound banking practice; management of a country ·s foreign
exchange reserves; formulation and implementation of monetary policy; acting as banker to Government and other banks
and as financial adviser to Government. The developmental
functions embrace the building up of a sound financial structure and the active promotion of capital formation necessary
for accelerated economic development.

1
External reserves are generally made up of gold, convertible currencies,
foreign bank balances and foreign short-dated government debt instruments.
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term maturity. Short-term government loans are raised
through the issue of treasury bills or/ and certificates while
long-term loans are raised using government stocks. Some
central banks underwrite these Joans to the extent that is not
taken up by the banks, non-bank financial institutions and the
general public. This is the practice in Nigeria. In other countries such as the U.K., the central bank does not determine
what amount can be raised but rather the commercial banks
and other financial institutions bid for the take up of government debt instruments by tender either as syndicates or severally. The interest rates payable on the loans are determined by
market forces and not given by the central bank as in the case of
Nigeria.

Developmental Functions

The developmental roles of central banks are more germane
to the LDCs than the MDCs. As has been noted earlier, the
latter economies have the necessary financial structure and
arrangements which give their central banks the scope to
exercise their traditional functions . The former economies
lack them. Thus in the LDCs, central banks have first to build
up the financial structure and nurture the financial arrangements which they have to regulate for the orderly growth
of the economy.
Most central banks in developing economies as exemplified
by the Central Bank of Nigeria have had to establish money
and capital market structures as well as organise their modus
operandi. The vital contribution by the Central Bank of
Nigeria to the setting up of the Lagos Stock Exchange in 1961,
its financial support to the establishment of specialised banks
such as the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, the Nigerian Agricultural Bank and the Nigerian Mortgage Bank (reconstituted
from the Nigerian Building Society) are cases in point. Its
introduction and management of various money market instruments such as the Treasury Bills (1961), Treasury Certificates (1968), Certificates of Deposits (CDs) and Bankers' Unit
Fund (BUF); (1975) are other examples of its role in fostering
the development of a diversified financial structure and instruments. These activities are undertaken for the purpose of
finding the funds for economic development and stimulating
much needed capital formation . Most developing economies
pursue economic development by formulating and implementing economic development plans. Nigeria has launched and
operated not less than four such plans since the eve of her
political independence. The financing of these plans has been
and remains a major concern of the C.B.N. Here lies the
explanation for the floatation of numerous government development stocks, the unsubscribed portions of which are generally taken up by the C .B.N.

Part ID
MONETARY POLICY
Objectives of Monetary Policy

The objectives of monetary policy (or management) as part
of the traditional functions of central banking include the
maintenance of relative price stability, a desired rate of economic growth , low rate of unemployment and a healthy balance of payments position. In the LDCs, the promotion of a
sound financial structure and ample financing of a desired pace
of economic growth are additional points of focus. The maintenance of relative price stability implies striking a balance
between money supply growth rate and real output growth
rate. In formulating realistic monetary policy to be pursued in
any given period the desired rate of growth of national output
must be known. Then a projection of what level of money
supply would be appropriate for this projected level of output is
made and efforts are subsequently geared towards ensuring
that money supply does not exceed or fall short of the desired
level.
While the central bank has the task of setting the desired
level of money supply, the decision as to the desired level of
output growth and employment is more often than not a political one that belongs to the government. Thus the money supply
target of the central bank has to be consistent with the stated
macro-economic objectives of the government.
It is generally recognised that the surpluses or deficits in a
country's balance of payments are somehow connected with its
rate of monetary expansion through credit expansion unless
the economy is a closed one. In an open economy, excessive
credit expansion or deficit financing in both the private and
public sectors leads to a draw-down of foreign reserves where
such credit is used to finance imports in excess of exports. To
prevent unnecessary reserve drain, a central bank might, if
considered desirable and beneficial to the economy, try to
forge a balance between foreign receipts and payments. If
foreign payments are met from bank credit which could not be
repaid by foreign earnings of equivalent amount, the credit
overflow is plugged using various devices discussed below
under instruments of monetary policy. If on the other hand a
country experiences balance of payments surpluses the fear
that such built-up surpluses could result in excessive domestic
money issue and its attendant inflationary pressures would call
for a further opening up of the economy for increased importation of goods and services and exportation of capital.

Other Functions

The central bank renders several other services to the government and the banking system. These include acting as
banker to the government as well as acting as its financial
adviser. As banker to the government, the central bank keeps
accounts for the government (including state governments in a
federal system). It manages government's public debt by floating or/and, underwriting such debt instruments receiving the
proceeds of such loans and paying the subscribers their interests and capital when these fall due.
To other financial institutions in the economy, the central
bank acts as lender of last resort mainly to ensure the stability
of the financial system . It keeps part of bank cash reserves as
current accounts on which they draw for clearing purposes. It
creates and manages money market instruments of various
descriptions and organises efficient clearing of cheques among
the banks.
In general, central banks manage government debt either
entirely on their own as in Nigeria or in conjunction with the
Treasury as in U.K. Management of government public debt
involves floating government loans of short, medium or Jong7
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stipulated loans and advances to agriculture and residential
building construction. Stabilization securities which also belong to the same class of instruments are issued by the central
bank to commercial banks at given interest rates and serve the
same purpose as special deposits in terms of squeezing banks'
excess cash holdings and restricting their credit expansion.
The securities are issued at the discretion of the central bank
based on the level of excess cash holdings of the banks as
judged by the central banks. The issue of these securities could
be intermittent depending on the circumstances. For example,
the Central Bank of Nigeria has in the current fiscal year
discontinued the issue of these securities because the banks'
cash and liquidity ratios have decreased significantly from the
levels of the past two previous fiscal years.
Direct credit control is the stipulation of permissible rates of
banks' credit expansion over a given period . It could take the
form of an overall ceiling on aggregate credit expansion or
sectoral allocation of permissible increase to different sectors
of the econorp.y or both. In Nigeria, both variants of selective
credit control have been applied in various years from 1969/70
to date. Other countries apply one form of credit control or the
other as their economic circumstances dictate.
Another instrument of monetary policy that deserves mention here is exchange control, which is the control exercised by
central banks over the release of foreign exchange to economic
agents that need them for foreign payments. Few countries
permit the unrestricted use of their foreign reserves for foreign
payments. This is because the volume of foreign reserves in
any economy frequently fall short of the demand. Even the
United States of America and the United Kingdon whose
national currencies are internationally traded impose limits on
the amount that could be used for any foreign transactions.
Such restrictions are aimed at ensuring that at any point in
time, the central bank should be able to meet very pressing
demands for foreign reserve backing that are necessary to
accord the national currency a respectable and safe status in
international financial markets. This is the reason behind the
adoption of exchange control by the Central Bank of Nigeria
from the late sixties to date, even during I974-76 when our
foreign reserve level was very high.

Instruments of Monetary Policy
The instruments of monetary policy in both the developed
and developing countries today include: open market operations; the rediscount or bank rate; moral suasion, various
forms of reserve requirements including cash and liquidity
ratios, special deposits and stabilization securities; selective
credit control; and direct regulation of interest rates.
Open Market Operations involve discretionary sale or purchase of government debt instruments in the money market by
the central bank. The sales are carried out to reduce the
liquidity or cash holding of the banks and the public while the
purchase is to increase it. Its application necessitates the variation of the rediscount rate and other interest rates, that are
linked to it- raising the rates at a time of sale and lowering
them at a time of purchase. For open market operations to be
effective, there have to be a developed and interest-sensitive
money and capital markets in which dealers are financially
literate and alert enough to read and understand the indicators
and to utilise the given opportunities. In this context it is clear
that only the MDCs with developed money and capital markets
can effectively use this instrument to achieve the desired objectives of policy.
Moral Suasion- an injuncton to banks to exercise caution
in credit expansion, or lend more to selected sectors of the
economy or observe certain banking procedures-is an agelong instrument. It is always in use even where specific measures are stipulated along with sanctions for non-compliance,
because the successful implementation of monetary policy
requires the co-operation of all financial institutions concerned
with the given directives.

Reserve Requirements
Cash reserve requirements and Liquidity ratio stipulations
have to do with ensuring that banks maintain safe ratios between their deposit liabilities and the cash or liquid assets they
hold. It can be used to limit banks' credit expansion as well as
to ensure that they are always in a position to meet their
customers ' demand for cash. The cash and liquidity ratios are
expressed as the ratios between their deposit liabilities and
their cash holding and selected liquid assets, respectively.
Different countries stipulate different reserve ratios. In Nigeria
the cash ratio was not emphasised for regulatory purposes until
recently. Emphasis was placed on the liquidity ratio which has,
nevertheless, remained at 25 per cent since it was first stipulated although the composition of qualified liquid assets bas
been varied over time. ln some MDCs such as the United
States of America, the cash ratio is an important monetary
policy instrument.
Special deposits are supplementary reserves used to scale
down the volume of banks ' liquidity when it is feared that
excessive bank cash balances may induce excessive credit and
monetary expansion. The deposits are made by commercial
banks in the central bank and are not allowed to be used as base
for credit expansion in that they do not count as liquid assets.
Generally these deposits earn no interest. Nigeria called for
these deposits in the civil war years in connection with local
currency pre-payment for import and currently for the same
reason and as a penalty to recalcitrant banks for short-falls in

Limitations of Monetary Policy
The problems of monetary policy formulation and implementation centre around the early detection of the financial
and economic conditions that call for change in the stance of
monetary policy, the timing of necessary action and the nature
and extent of action to be taken, and more importantly the
uncertainty and unpredictability of the likely effects of the
action when taken. The central bank requires other banks and
financial institutions in the economy to report periodically on
their activities so as to monitor the trend of monetary development in the economy. The central bank also requires data on the
developments in the real sectors of the economy to enable it to
reach an objective judgement of what policy actions to adopt at
any point in time.
In the MDCs where reporting is regular and data collection
machinery is more efficient, it is less difficult to detect in good
time when things are getting out of hand in the economic
8

scene . But in the LDCs reporting is often irregular and less
adequate and consequently the detection of upsetting monetary
trends are much more difficult and less timely. Relevant real
sector statistics are even more difficult to obtain as adequately
and timely as needed.
Even when detection of destabilising monetary developments is timely, the decision as to what corrective action to take
and its extent is not often so clear-cut. The situation may be
worse if the freedom of action of the Central Bank is seriously
circumscribed. Few economies accord their central bank complete autonomy in deciding the instrument and timing of what
monetary policy actions to take in correcting disequilibrating
monetary forces. In the process of reaching an agreement with
the government on what actions to take in periods of monetary
disturbances, the central bank might find that whatever actions
are eventually taken might not be adequate or timely for the
attainment of identified objectives. That is why the central
banker more often than not persists in asking for complete
autonomy in monetary management. But because monetary
management is expected to be operated within the context of
specified national economic goals (which goals are invariably
politically determined), the central bank has to defer to or at
least cooperate with the whims and caprices of the government
of the day. This is one of the fundamental problems of monetary management.

tionale for this accepted relationship between government and
the central bank in terms of control are:
(a) that freedom of operation for a central bank will promote greater flexibility and business efficiency;
(b) that monetary affairs are highly technical and deserve to
be managed independently and objectively; and
(c) that undue government interference with central bank
monetary management may subject the bank to political
pressures that could result in unsound monetary policy
and destabilising inflationary financing.
Three central banks that have substantial autonomy could be
cited, viz; the Federal Reserve System of the U.S.A ., the
Deutsche Bundesbank of West Germany and Swiss National
Bank. In the case of the Federal Reserve System, neither the
lreasury nor even the U.S. President has the authority to
dictate to the Board of Governors of the System whether
regarding its internal administration or in the performance of
its statutory duties or what monetary policy to pursue. The
system's Board seek to support the governments economic
policy so long and to the extent that such support will not
involve compromising its responsibility for monetary and
price stability. The Reserve system is only accountable to
Congress and the public for the performance of its functions.
The West German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) is
similarly autonomous and does not come under government
supervision. Both in its internal administration, and in the
performance of its statutory functions and choice of monetary
policy it is as autonomous as the U.S. Federal Reserve System.
Its relationship with the government is similar to that of the
U.S. Federal Reserve System. The Swiss National Bank also
enjoys the same degree of autonomy and relationship with the
government as the two other central banks mentioned above.
Partial autonomy is enjoyed by other central banks outside
the group discussed above. These central banks enjoy considerable autonomy but are subject to dictation from the Minister
of Finance or other government functionary in respect of some
specific functions of which the most important is monetary
policy formulation and execution.
Where the "dependent" central bank and the Treasury disagree over monetary policy issue, the Minister (or Commissioner) can, after consultations with the Bank's management,
issue a directive to the central bank as to what policy to adopt.
The process of issuing such a directive varies among such
central banks. In the Netherlands, for example, the Minister of
Finance can issue such a directive after consulting with the
central bank which is empowered to appeal to the Cabinet or
Executive Council. The cabinet or Executive Council's decision on such issues is final. In Botswana and Canada, if the
Minister disagrees with the monetary policy being pursued by
the central bank, he would initially inform the bank of his
disagreement and subsequently take the matter to the President
(in Botswana) or the Governor General-in-Council (in
Canada) for consideration and determination. The decision at
this level is final. Notwithstanding these powers of government over these central banks under discussion, the independence and prestige of these central banks are still protected
through some safeguards or checks and balances.

Part IV
CENTRAL BANK-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP
Although a central bank is a government institution, it is not
in all cases that it is completely government-owned in terms of
capital. The newly established central banks in the LDCs are
virtually government-owned. The authorised and paid up capital of most of the MDCs ' central banks which formerly had
been privately owned has been nationalised. But there are
exceptions. The capital of the central banks of Belgium, Australia, U.S.A. , Switzerland, Mexico and Japan are still partly
privately-held. The capital of the Bank of Italy is owned by
various financial institutions in which the government holds
directly or indirectly a majority interest. However, whether a
central bank is completely or partly government-owned, the
government, in most cases, has less real power than would a
majority shareholder in a private company. This is because
although the members of the Banks Board and its senior
management are appointed by the government the statute of
the banks normally provides for a number of safeguards to give
these appointees a reasonable measure of independence in the
performance of their functions. In this section, we shall discuss the extent of government control of central banks in some
selected countries.
Degree of Government Control
In most countries, it is recognised that the central bank is not
just like any other parastatal or government agency. This is
because it is accepted that the nature of its functions especially
as the ultimate source of liquidity and controller of money
supply which places it in a special class, calls for its not being
controlled by government as other parastatals are. The ra9

siderable degree of independence" and that it is "no accident
that Germany and Switzerland which in recent years also have
managed their economy better than most others happen to have
strong and independent monetary authorities like ours". Similarly, a recent Royal Commission in Canada thought that protection from inflation and from influence on the monetary
markets of day to day political considerations unrelated to the
broad aims of monetary and fiscal policies were the major
reasons for retaining the independence of the Bank of Canada.
It is generally recognised that in a Presidential system of
government, a lot of power is concentrated in the hands of the
President, and that the President is in a much more powerful
position than, say, a Prime Minister under a Parliamentary
form of government. This underlies the argument that there is
special need for strong and independent central banks in countries that have a Presidential system of government.

These are: (a) the bank 's right of appeal to the highest
authority such as the Cabinet or Executive Council. (b) Where
the directive is issued by the government, i.e., the Crown or
the Executive Council, the directive together with the central
bank 's views and government motives for issuing the directive
must be made public. In Botswana such a directive must be
published in the Government gazette forthwith and laid before
the National Parliament within 15 days after the Minister had
informed the bank of the policy directives.
A third group of central banks could be described as legally
subordinate in that the Treasury is empowered to issue the
directive without the type of safeguards provided for the second group above to protect their relative autonomy. Examples
are Bank of England, Bank of India, Bank of Zambia and the
Bank of France since 1973 when the new Bank of France law
was passed. However, in the case of the Bank of England, the
Treasury while maintaining its superiority over the Bank is
very conscious of the reality that the Bank needs an appreciable degree of independence.
There are however some limitations placed on the amou nt of
government debt instruments a central bank can hold at any
point in time. The limits are invariably tied to and set as a given
percentage of the budgeted revenue of government in a fiscal
year. The stipulated limit is in general practice stated in the
statute that established the central bank. This can be ascertained by looking through the Acts setting up these banks. The
idea behind setting a limit to central bank lending to government is to ensure that government does not plunge the economy into monetary chaos through excessive borrowing.

Part V
THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was set up under the
Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 and started full-scale operations on 1st July 1959. The principal objects of the Bank as
stipulated in the Act are: the issue of legal tender currency in
Nigeria, the maintenance of external reserve to safeguard the
international value of the currency, the promotion of monetary
stabi lity and a sound financial structure in Nigeria, and serving
as a banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government.
The CBN, like any other central bank discharges all the
traditional functions of a central bank. But because Nigeria is a
developing economy the CBN has had to emphasize the developmental roles of a central bank enumerated earlier in this
paper. Even, in discharging the important traditional function
of monetary control, it has relied more on direct than on
indirect control measures also because of the low level of the
country's economic and fi nancial development. For example,
it has been prescribing rates of credit expansion and sectoral
distribution of credit for the commercial banks since 1969 and
merchant banks from 1977. From April 1976 it introduced new
financial instruments to reduce banks' liquidity and credit
expansion at a time when monetary stability was threatened by
a surfeit of liquidity in the financial system .
The developmental functions emphasised by CBN include
the promotion of local money and capital markets and the
establishment of other related financial institutions, as well as
engaging in direct and indirect financing of economic development.
To promote the indigenous money market, the Bank designed and issued the first Nigerian treasury bills in 1960. This
was followed by the introduction of treasury certificates in
1968. But before then, it established in 1962, a call Money
Fund (Scheme) managed by itself, for investing temporary
funds of commercial banks and other financial institutions on
overnight basis. This scheme was however terminated in July
1974 at a time when large increases in government revenue
from crude oil made it unnecessary to issue the amount of
treasury bills requisite to sustain the continued operation of the
scheme. At the same time the growth rate of deposit liabilities
of the banks accelerated because of the generally high liquidity

The Need for Central Bank Autonomy:

Many advantages have been associated with central bank
independence within the government. One of them is that an
independent central bank wi ll be able to operate with greater
flexibility, speed, and efficiency. Another is the fact that monetary affairs are highly technical and deserve to be managed
independently and objectively. However, the most important
reason for giving autonomy to central banks is that political
control of the currency carries a danger of financial indiscipline and incessant monetary instability. This means that government control of a central bank may subject the bank to
political pressures that could result in unsound monetary policy, where the exigencies of government finance may conflict
with the dictates of sound monetary management.
If the operation of a central bank is to be in the best socioeconomic interest of the people, monetary and banking
policies should be as unbiased and detached from any type of
partisan interest as possible. As a former Chairman of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System (Mr. William M. Martins) put it,
"when the Federal Reserve System succumbs to the pressures
of political expediency or the dictates of private interest the
ground work of sound money is undermined". A Central Bank
is in a better position to carry out its functions more efficiently
when it is independent within the structure of the government .
This is further supported in a recent address given by Arthur F.
Burns, former Chairman of the Board of the Federal Reserve
System that "the capacity of the Federal Reserve to maintain a
meaningful anti-inflation posture is made possible by its con10

of the economy. To provide the ban.ks with outlets for their fast
growing idle funds three new money market instruments were
designed and introduced by the CBN in between 1974 and
1976. These are:
(i) Certificates of deposits aimed at facilitating the channelling of commercial banks' surplus funds to the merchant banks;
(ii) Bankers ' Unit Fund (BUF), to provide an avenue for
the short-term investment of commercial ban.ks ' funds
in Government development stocks; and
(iii) Eligible Development Stocks-development stocks of
not more than three years maturity which could be
counted as banks ' liquid assets.
The development of an indigenous capital market has also
been the concern of the CBN. In 1961 the Bank participated in
the planning and setting up of the Lagos Stock Exchange and
acted as its main financier at the early stages. Since then the
Bank has contributed to the transformation of the Lagos Stock
Exchange to the Nigerian Stock Exchange (N.S.E.) which
now has three branches in Lagos, Kaduna and Port Harcourt.
This market deals in government securities which are issued
and managed by CBN and private securities which have increased both in volume and in value between 1972 and 1978
when the Indigenous Enterprises Promotion Scheme was implemented. The CBN contributed immensely to the successful
financing of that scheme through its credit policy which excluded from credit ceilings loans granted by commercial banks
to individuals for the purpose of buying shares and business
under the scheme.
Another way in which CBN has contributed to the development of the financial system and the economy is through
participation in the establishment of specialised financial institutions such as the Nigerian Industrial Development bank in
1964, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry in 1973,
the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank in 1973 and
the Federal Mortgage Bank in 1977. 1 It advised the government
and carried through the set up of a NlOO million Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Fund in 1977 to guarantee commercial and
merchant banks' agricultural credit up to 75 per cent. This
aims at increasing the flow of credit to the agricultural sector in
an attempt to restore the importance of that sector in feeding
the nation, foreign reserve earnings and providing industrial
raw materials.
The CBN also contributes significantly to economic research and the assembly of economic and financial statistics
which are very essential for objective planning by individuals,
institutions and the nation. Its publications such as the Annual
Reports, Economic and Financial Review and Monthly Reports are concrete evidence of these contributions.

through the Governor of the Central Bank. This was a recognition of the close relationship between monetary policy and
banking policy. The bank examines all applications to establish
new banks. It receives monthly reports prescribed in the Banking Acts and Annual Monetary Policy Circulars which enable
the Bank to monitor the activities of the banks on a continuous
basis. The Bank also carries out full scale examination of
individual banks at intervals of between 12 and 18 months.

Recent Development in Central Bank of
Nigeria/Government Relationship
Although the CBN has existed for only twenty years, there
have been some dramatic changes in its relations with the
Federal Government of Nigeria which has affected the degree
of its autonomy. For purpose of clarity and convenience, the
discussion in this section will be carried out under two broad
periods- the pre-military era (1958-1966), and the military era
(1966-1979) .

The Pre-Military Era
The Act that set up the CBN in 1958, entrusted it with
specific powers, functions and responsibilities. Under the Act,
its Board of Directors had responsibility for the policy and
general administration of the affairs of the Bank. Regarding
monetary policy, the CBN was entrusted with the responsibility for promoting monetary stability and financial structure.
There was no provision in the Act empowering either the
Ministry of Finance, the Government or any external body to
intervene or dictate to the Bank in these matters. It was not an
omission; it was a recognition of the need to leave Central
Bank free from interference for political ends. Thus, while
recognising that the political arm of the government must
retain ultimate responsibility for policy formulation , the original Act guaranteed the Central Bank a measure of independence which is necessary and essential for efficient central
banking and sound monetary policy.
In that environment the CBN had a free hand not only in
matters concerning its internal administration but also with
regard to the performance of its statutory functions. It formulated monetary policy without any dictation from the government or any other external body. However, recognising the fact
that monetary policy operates as one important element in the
totality of national policies (both financial and non-financial)
which are directed towards broad economic objectives, the
CBN 's process of formulating monetary policy included consultation with the government through the Ministry of Finance. This was done to achieve a desirable degree of coordination of monetary and other economic policies in order to
achieve the overall economic objectives of the community.
Thus, the relation between the central bank and the government was based on consultation and co-operation which
worked satisfactorily.
With regard to internal administration of the Bank, the
original Act gave the Bank a free hand to manage its affairs in
line with the normal practice all over the world. As specified in
the original CBN Act, "All appointments of officials and other
employees of the Bank shall be only to positions created by the

Banking Supervision
The Central Bank took over the responsibility of examining
and supervising the commercial banking system in January,
1966. Even before then, reports on bank examinations carried
out by the Bank Examiner who was then based in the Ministry
of Finance had to be submitted to the Minister of Finance
1
The Federal Mortgage Banlc was reconstituted from lhe former Nigerian
Building Society.
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the Commissioner, for approval, before any award of
such contract is made, (section 2(3)).
(ii) The Board of Directors is required to seek the approval
of the Commissioner for Finance before it can open
branches of the Bank and appoint its correspondents or
agents; (section 5).
(iii) "The salaries ofthe employees of the Bank (other than
those of the Governor or his Deputy shall be as stipulated from time to time by the Federal Executive Council, and the Board shall accordingly be guided in terms
of the scales of salary provided thereof; and without
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the scales
of salary set out in the schedule to the statutory corporations (salaries) and allowances, etc.) The allowances
and benefits, other than salaries and retiring benefits,
as may from time to time be stipulated by the Federal
Executive Council for members of the public service of
the Federation shall in like manner apply to the employees of the Bank."
A superficial observer might, in the light of the foregoing be
tempted to think that the Central Bank is just a little more than a
department or an office of the Federal Ministry of Finance. But
I can say that on the really important issues of monetary policy
the views and advice of the Central Bank have generally been
respected.
Nevertheless, it is important that under the imminent Presidential system, the legislation enacted by the Military Regime
restricting the independence of the Central Bank should be
repealed in order to enhance the efficiency and prestige of the
Bank. It may also be pointed out that one of the provisions of
the new Constitution is that there will be a National Economic
Council to be headed by the Vice-President of the Federation.
Other members of the Council are the Governor of each State
and the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The function
of the National Economic Council is to advise the President on
the economic affairs of the Federation, and in particular, on
measures necessary for the co-ordination of the economic
efforts or economic programmes of the various Governments
of the Federation. The membership of the Governor of the
Central Bank in the National Economic Council indicates the
important role envisaged for the Bank under the new system of
administration. It will therefore be very appropriate to repeal
those Decrees enacted by the Military Regime which are
inconsistent with the autonomy of the Central Bank enshrined
in its original Charter.
Early in July this year the Central Bank celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of its commencement of full scale operations.
Perhaps it will be quite in order to conclude this lecture by
quoting a part of the congratulatory message of the Head of
State, His Excellency, General Olusegun Obasanjo to the Bank
on the occasion, as follows:"The Central Bank of Nigeria has so far successfully
arranged and successfully administered few currency issues since its foundation and on each occasion, the Bank
confounded the sceptics and critics by making a complete
success of the currency change. The Bank further witnessed the period when Nigerian External reserve suddenly
rose from a very small amount to the 1973-74 period
when it suddenly swelled to literally unmanageable pro-

decision of the Board ". The stipulations were adhered to from
the inception of the Bank till 1970. The Board of Directors was
(as it should be) the highest authority in the management of the
affairs and business of the Bank. It employed the various
categories of its staff and determined their conditions of service in such a way as to ensure that it was able to attract
qualified and capable staff needed to run efficiently the important and delicate business of central banking. The functioning
of the Central Bank under these legislations could be said to
have been smooth and of a high level of efficiency.

The Military Era
Under the Military regime, the powers and independence
earlier conferred on the Central Bank by Acts of Parliament
were persistently eroded, particularly by two Decrees, namely
Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Decree (No. 3) of
1968 and Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree (No.
40) of 1970.
The Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Decree of
1968 directed that the Board of Directors of the Central Bank
shall keep the Commissioner for Finance informed of the
monetary and banking policy pursued by the Central Bank.
The amendment gave the Commissioner power to present his
own case where he disagrees with the CBN, and that of the
CBN before the Federal Executive Council for the final and
binding decision.
It would appear at first sight that this amendment to the Bank
Act did not create a serious dent on the independence of the
Central Bank since in the event of disagreement, the final
decision would be taken at the Federal Executive Council.
However, the danger lies in the fact that the (Amendment)
Decree did not specify the mode of presenting Central Bank 's
case to the Executive Council . The Commissioner is left to
present it the way he thinks fit. Since the Central Bank would
not be represented at the Council when the matter is being
discussed, the Commissioner could intentionally or unintentionally distort the Bank's case with serious consequences to
the Bank's status, prestige, and efficiency. True, there has, so
far, not been serious conflicts of views between the Treasury
and CBN on monetary policy. However, the danger posed by
the (Amendment) Decree potentially exists. In recognition of
this, the Financial System Review Committee in their report
dated December 1976 recommended "an amendment to
strengthen the process whereby the Central Bank's proposals
on monetary and banking policy reaches the Federal Executive
Council". The recommendation was that in case of disagreement, the Commissioner of Finance, should "submit his representation and the representation of the Central Bank, without
any abridgement, to the Federal Executive Council". Unfortunately, the Federal Military Government (in its white paper
on the Committee's Report) rejected this recommendation.
The provisions of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Decree No. 40 of 1970 may be summarised as follows:(i) any contract relating to any project of a value of not less
than NO. l million (now increased to Nl.O million) shall
be referred to the Federal Executive Council through
12

portion only for the reserve to be fast expended to the
dangerously low 1978/79 level when drastic fiscal measures had to be introduced to keep Nigeria out of bankruptcy. As we witness some positive developments in this
direction, I can say without reservation that some of the
credit for piloting the country away from the path of
financial and economic disaster must go to the Central
Bank of Nigeria for its timely advice and the dedication
with which it implemented Government measures".
"The growth and development of the Central Bank coincided with unprecedented growth in the Nigerian economic and commercial sector the effect of which led in
many cases to the overwhelming and crumbling of many
a public institution. The survival and indeed the success
of the Central Bank of Nigeria in spite of the odds in
question therefore amounts to the testing of the resourcefulness, efficiency and dedication of the Board,
Management and staff of the Central Bank. Having
triumphantly overcome its problems during the last 20
years and particularly in the recent past, I am therefore
fully confident that the Central Bank would overcome any
problems and challenges that would confront it in future
and continue to grow from strength to strength."

Part VI
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
To summarise, we have examined in general the identity,
raison d 'etre, origin and role of a central bank and its relationship with government. The Nigerian case has been used to
exemplify in several cases the features covered in the general
case. The salient points emanating from the text are outlined as
follows:!. The central bank occupies the apex of the institutional
structure of the financial systems of mixed economies. This is
clearly indicated by its traditional and developmental roles of
issuance of legal tender currency, monetary management,
supervision of the operations of the financial system; the
rendering of various banking services to government and the
financial system and the promotion of sound financial structure for the economy, as well as acting as an agent of economic
development and as a nation's ambassador in international
financial relations.

2. Central banking originated in the more developed
economies when these economies decided to replace the
proven unreliable automatic control mechanism of the "invisible hand" with discretionary control of their economies. The
less developed economies, have also adopted and adapted
banking to suit the needs of their economies.
3. Modern central banks are generally completely government owned although some cases of joint public/ private ownership still exist. They are generally accorded some measure of
autonomy ranging from complete autonomy in some countries
to meagre autonomy in others, in carrying out their functions.
Central bank autonomy is recognised because of the specialised and technical nature of central bank's pivotal function
of monetary management which requires objectivity and freedom from political pressures .
4 . The Central Bank of Nigeria like any other central bank
has been conditioned by its economic environment both in
establishment and in its operations. It is wholly owned by the
Federal Government. Although it performs traditional functions of a central bank, but conditioned by environment, it
found traditional instruments and approach hardly applicable
and resorted to more direct control measures. It also had to
emphasise developmental roles for the same considerations.
The relation between the Bank and Government was also
conditioned by environment. In its early history it enjoyed a
high degree of autonomy. But later on when government
changed from civilian to military and especially during the
civil war the environment required more direct intervention in
the affairs of the Bank.
5. Certain Legislations enacted between 1968 and 1970 have
eroded the autonomy of the Central Bank . In spite of these
constraints, the Bank has successfully, in co-operation with the
Government, steered the economy through years of varying
monetary and economic experiences.

0. Ola Vincent
Governor
Central Bank of Nigeria,
Lagos.
lecture delivered on the 10th September, 1979, at National lnstillltefor Policy
and Strategic Studies, Kuru , near Jos.
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